Exploiting the Physical Disparity: Side-Channel Attacks on Memory Encryption

Thomas Unterluggauer; Stefan Mangard

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-43283-0_1

Exploiting the Physical Disparity: Side-Channel Attacks on Memory Encryption

Thomas Unterluggauer, Stefan Mangard

Institut für Angewandte Informationsverarbeitung und Kommunikationstechnologie (7050)

Publikation: Beitrag in Buch/Bericht/Konferenzband › Beitrag in einem Konferenzband › Begutachtung

Abstract

Memory and disk encryption is a common measure to protect sensitive information in memory from adversaries with physical access. However, physical access also comes with the risk of physical attacks. As these may pose a threat to memory confidentiality, this paper investigates contemporary memory and disk encryption schemes and their implementations with respect to Differential Power Analysis (DPA) and Differential Fault Analysis (DFA). It shows that DPA and DFA recover the keys of all the investigated schemes, including the tweakable block ciphers XEX and XTS. This paper also verifies the feasibility of such attacks in practice. Using the EM side channel, a DPA on the disk encryption employed
within the ext4 file system is shown to reveal the used master key on a Zynq Z-7010 system on chip. The results suggest that memory and disk encryption secure against physical attackers is at least four times more expensive.

Originalsprache	englisch
Titel	Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design - COSADE 2016
Herausgeber (Verlag)	Springer International Publishing AG
Seiten	3-18
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43283-0_1
Publikationsstatus	Veröffentlicht - 2016
Veranstaltung	International Workshop on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design - Graz, Österreich Dauer: 14 Apr. 2016 → 15 Apr. 2016

Publikationsreihe

Name	LNCS
Band	9689

Konferenz

Konferenz	International Workshop on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design
Land/Gebiet	Österreich
Ort	Graz
Zeitraum	14/04/16 → 15/04/16

Fields of Expertise

Information, Communication & Computing

Zugriff auf Dokument

10.1007/978-3-319-43283-0_1

cosade_2016Akzeptiertes Autorenmanuskript, 1,1 MB

https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/473.pdf

MEMSEC - Integration Memory Security Unit für Automotive Test Systeme.[Originaler Titel in Englisch: Embedded Memory Security Unit for Automotive Test Systems]
Mangard, S.
1/09/14 → 31/08/17
Projekt: Forschungsprojekt

Dieses zitieren

Unterluggauer, T & Mangard, S 2016, Exploiting the Physical Disparity: Side-Channel Attacks on Memory Encryption. in Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design - COSADE 2016. LNCS, Bd. 9689, Springer International Publishing AG , S. 3-18, International Workshop on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design, Graz, Österreich, 14/04/16. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43283-0_1

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abstract = "Memory and disk encryption is a common measure to protect sensitive information in memory from adversaries with physical access. However, physical access also comes with the risk of physical attacks. As these may pose a threat to memory confidentiality, this paper investigates contemporary memory and disk encryption schemes and their implementations with respect to Differential Power Analysis (DPA) and Differential Fault Analysis (DFA). It shows that DPA and DFA recover the keys of all the investigated schemes, including the tweakable block ciphers XEX and XTS. This paper also verifies the feasibility of such attacks in practice. Using the EM side channel, a DPA on the disk encryption employed within the ext4 file system is shown to reveal the used master key on a Zynq Z-7010 system on chip. The results suggest that memory and disk encryption secure against physical attackers is at least four times more expensive. ",

keywords = "memory encryption, side-channel attacks, DPA, fault analysis, DFA, power analysis, ext4",

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T1 - Exploiting the Physical Disparity: Side-Channel Attacks on Memory Encryption

AU - Unterluggauer, Thomas

AU - Mangard, Stefan

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N2 - Memory and disk encryption is a common measure to protect sensitive information in memory from adversaries with physical access. However, physical access also comes with the risk of physical attacks. As these may pose a threat to memory confidentiality, this paper investigates contemporary memory and disk encryption schemes and their implementations with respect to Differential Power Analysis (DPA) and Differential Fault Analysis (DFA). It shows that DPA and DFA recover the keys of all the investigated schemes, including the tweakable block ciphers XEX and XTS. This paper also verifies the feasibility of such attacks in practice. Using the EM side channel, a DPA on the disk encryption employed within the ext4 file system is shown to reveal the used master key on a Zynq Z-7010 system on chip. The results suggest that memory and disk encryption secure against physical attackers is at least four times more expensive.

AB - Memory and disk encryption is a common measure to protect sensitive information in memory from adversaries with physical access. However, physical access also comes with the risk of physical attacks. As these may pose a threat to memory confidentiality, this paper investigates contemporary memory and disk encryption schemes and their implementations with respect to Differential Power Analysis (DPA) and Differential Fault Analysis (DFA). It shows that DPA and DFA recover the keys of all the investigated schemes, including the tweakable block ciphers XEX and XTS. This paper also verifies the feasibility of such attacks in practice. Using the EM side channel, a DPA on the disk encryption employed within the ext4 file system is shown to reveal the used master key on a Zynq Z-7010 system on chip. The results suggest that memory and disk encryption secure against physical attackers is at least four times more expensive.

KW - memory encryption

KW - side-channel attacks

KW - DPA

KW - fault analysis

KW - DFA

KW - power analysis

KW - ext4

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-43283-0_1

DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-43283-0_1

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BT - Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design - COSADE 2016

PB - Springer International Publishing AG

T2 - International Workshop on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design

Y2 - 14 April 2016 through 15 April 2016

ER -

Exploiting the Physical Disparity: Side-Channel Attacks on Memory Encryption

Abstract

Publikationsreihe

Konferenz

Fields of Expertise

Zugriff auf Dokument

Fingerprint

Projekte

MEMSEC - Integration Memory Security Unit für Automotive Test Systeme.[Originaler Titel in Englisch: Embedded Memory Security Unit for Automotive Test Systems]

Dieses zitieren