Abstract
We present a new generic cache template attack technique, LBTA, layered binary templating attacks.
LBTA uses multiple coarsergrained side channels to speed up cache-line granularity templating, ranging from 64 B to 2 MB in practice and in theory beyond.
We discover first-come-first-serve data placement and data deduplication during compilation and linking as novel security issues that introduce sidechannel-friendly binary layouts.
We exploit this in inter-keystroke timing attacks and, depending on the target, even full keylogging attacks , e.g., on Chrome, Signal, Threema, Discord, and the passky password manager, indicating that all Chromium-based apps are affected.
LBTA uses multiple coarsergrained side channels to speed up cache-line granularity templating, ranging from 64 B to 2 MB in practice and in theory beyond.
We discover first-come-first-serve data placement and data deduplication during compilation and linking as novel security issues that introduce sidechannel-friendly binary layouts.
We exploit this in inter-keystroke timing attacks and, depending on the target, even full keylogging attacks , e.g., on Chrome, Signal, Threema, Discord, and the passky password manager, indicating that all Chromium-based apps are affected.
| Originalsprache | englisch |
|---|---|
| Titel | 21st International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security: ACNS 2023 |
| Seitenumfang | 27 |
| Publikationsstatus | Eingereicht - 2023 |
| Veranstaltung | 21st International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security: ACNS 2023 - Kyoto, Japan Dauer: 19 Juni 2023 → 22 Juni 2023 |
Konferenz
| Konferenz | 21st International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security |
|---|---|
| Kurztitel | ACNS 2023 |
| Land/Gebiet | Japan |
| Ort | Kyoto |
| Zeitraum | 19/06/23 → 22/06/23 |