Layered Binary Templating

Martin Schwarzl*, Erik Kraft, Daniel Gruss

*Korrespondierende/r Autor/-in für diese Arbeit

Publikation: Beitrag in Buch/Bericht/KonferenzbandBeitrag in einem KonferenzbandBegutachtung

Abstract

We present a new generic cache template attack technique, LBTA, layered binary templating attacks.
LBTA uses multiple coarsergrained side channels to speed up cache-line granularity templating, ranging from 64 B to 2 MB in practice and in theory beyond.
We discover first-come-first-serve data placement and data deduplication during compilation and linking as novel security issues that introduce sidechannel-friendly binary layouts.
We exploit this in inter-keystroke timing attacks and, depending on the target, even full keylogging attacks , e.g., on Chrome, Signal, Threema, Discord, and the passky password manager, indicating that all Chromium-based apps are affected.
Originalspracheenglisch
TitelApplied Cryptography and Network Security
Untertitel21st International Conference, ACNS 2023, Kyoto, Japan, June 19–22, 2023, Proceedings, Part I
ErscheinungsortCham
Herausgeber (Verlag)Springer
Seitenumfang27
DOIs
PublikationsstatusVeröffentlicht - 2023
Veranstaltung21st International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security: ACNS 2023 - Kyoto, Japan
Dauer: 19 Juni 202322 Juni 2023

Publikationsreihe

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
Band13905

Konferenz

Konferenz21st International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
KurztitelACNS 2023
Land/GebietJapan
OrtKyoto
Zeitraum19/06/2322/06/23

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