NetSpectre: Read Arbitrary Memory over Network

Michael Schwarz, Martin Schwarzl, Moritz Lipp, Jon Masters, Daniel Gruß

Publikation: Beitrag in Buch/Bericht/KonferenzbandBeitrag in einem KonferenzbandBegutachtung

Abstract

All Spectre attacks so far required local code execution. We present the first fully remote Spectre attack. For this purpose, we demonstrate the first access-driven remote Evict+Reload cache attack over the network, leaking 15 bits per hour. We present a novel high-performance AVX-based covert channel that we use in our cache-free Spectre attack.
We show that in particular remote Spectre attacks perform significantly better with the AVX-based covert channel, leaking 60 bits per hour from the target system. We demonstrate practical NetSpectre attacks on the Google cloud, remotely leaking data and remotely breaking ASLR.
Originalspracheenglisch
TitelComputer Security - ESORICS 2019
Untertitel24th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, Luxembourg, September 23–27, 2019, Proceedings
ErscheinungsortCham
Herausgeber (Verlag)Springer
Seiten279-299
Band1
ISBN (elektronisch)978-3-030-29959-0
ISBN (Print)978-3-030-29958-3
DOIs
PublikationsstatusVeröffentlicht - Sept. 2019
VeranstaltungESORICS 2019: 24th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security - Luxembourg, Luxemburg
Dauer: 23 Sept. 201927 Sept. 2019

Publikationsreihe

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
Band 11735

Konferenz

KonferenzESORICS 2019
Land/GebietLuxemburg
OrtLuxembourg
Zeitraum23/09/1927/09/19

Fingerprint

Untersuchen Sie die Forschungsthemen von „NetSpectre: Read Arbitrary Memory over Network“. Zusammen bilden sie einen einzigartigen Fingerprint.

Dieses zitieren