How trusted execution environments fuel research on microarchitectural attacks

Michael Schwarz; Daniel Gruss

doi:10.1109/MSEC.2020.2993896

How trusted execution environments fuel research on microarchitectural attacks

Michael Schwarz, Daniel Gruss

Institute of Applied Information Processing and Communications (7050)

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Trusted execution environments (TEEs) enabled research in scenarios where highest-privileged attackers had precise control over systems and microarchitecture. Insights gained from such attacks facilitated the discovery of non-TEE attacks, such as Spectre (as well as Foreshadow from within virtual machines).

Original language	English
Article number	9107096
Pages (from-to)	18-27
Number of pages	10
Journal	IEEE Security & Privacy
Volume	18
Issue number	5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/MSEC.2020.2993896
Publication status	Published - 1 Sept 2020

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Computer Networks and Communications
Electrical and Electronic Engineering
Law

Access to Document

10.1109/MSEC.2020.2993896

Cite this

@article{a7c3c62d51ec49c0ba445e56367e51bd,

title = "How trusted execution environments fuel research on microarchitectural attacks",

abstract = "Trusted execution environments (TEEs) enabled research in scenarios where highest-privileged attackers had precise control over systems and microarchitecture. Insights gained from such attacks facilitated the discovery of non-TEE attacks, such as Spectre (as well as Foreshadow from within virtual machines).",

author = "Michael Schwarz and Daniel Gruss",

year = "2020",

month = sep,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1109/MSEC.2020.2993896",

language = "English",

volume = "18",

pages = "18--27",

journal = "IEEE Security & Privacy",

issn = "1540-7993",

publisher = "Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers",

number = "5",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - How trusted execution environments fuel research on microarchitectural attacks

AU - Schwarz, Michael

AU - Gruss, Daniel

PY - 2020/9/1

Y1 - 2020/9/1

N2 - Trusted execution environments (TEEs) enabled research in scenarios where highest-privileged attackers had precise control over systems and microarchitecture. Insights gained from such attacks facilitated the discovery of non-TEE attacks, such as Spectre (as well as Foreshadow from within virtual machines).

AB - Trusted execution environments (TEEs) enabled research in scenarios where highest-privileged attackers had precise control over systems and microarchitecture. Insights gained from such attacks facilitated the discovery of non-TEE attacks, such as Spectre (as well as Foreshadow from within virtual machines).

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85086229971&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1109/MSEC.2020.2993896

DO - 10.1109/MSEC.2020.2993896

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85086229971

SN - 1540-7993

VL - 18

SP - 18

EP - 27

JO - IEEE Security & Privacy

JF - IEEE Security & Privacy

IS - 5

M1 - 9107096

ER -

How trusted execution environments fuel research on microarchitectural attacks

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Leakage-Free - Hardware-Software Information Flow Analysis for Leakage-Free Code Generation

Cite this

How trusted execution environments fuel research on microarchitectural attacks

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Projects

Leakage-Free - Hardware-Software Information Flow Analysis for Leakage-Free Code Generation

Cite this