ISAP v2.0

Christoph Dobraunig; Maria Eichlseder; Stefan Mangard; Florian Mendel; Bart Mennink; Robert Primas; Thomas Unterluggauer

doi:https://doi.org/10.13154/tosc.v2020.iS1.390-416

ISAP v2.0

Christoph Dobraunig, Maria Eichlseder, Stefan Mangard, Florian Mendel, Bart Mennink, Robert Primas, Thomas Unterluggauer

Institute of Applied Information Processing and Communications (7050)

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We specify Isap v2.0, a lightweight permutation-based authenticated encryption algorithm that is designed to ease protection against side-channel and fault attacks. This design is an improved version of the previously published Isap v1.0, and offers increased protection against implementation attacks as well as more efficient implementations. Isap v2.0 is a candidate in NIST’s LightWeight Cryptography (LWC) project, which aims to identify and standardize authenticated ciphers that are well-suited for applications in constrained environments. We provide a self-contained specification of the new Isap v2.0 mode and discuss its design rationale. We formally prove the security of the Isap v2.0 mode in the leakage-resilient setting. Finally, in an extensive implementation overview, we show that Isap v2.0 can be implemented securely with very low area requirements.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	390-416
Number of pages	27
Journal	IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology
Volume	2020
Issue number	Special Issue 1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.13154/tosc.v2020.iS1.390-416
Publication status	Published - Jun 2020

Keywords

Authenticated encryption
Leakage resilience
NIST LWC
Sponges

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Software
Computational Mathematics
Applied Mathematics
Computer Science Applications

Access to Document

https://doi.org/10.13154/tosc.v2020.iS1.390-416Licence: CC BY 4.0

Cite this

@article{7961d14b9d8a4f82a047c5f502baef83,

title = "ISAP v2.0",

abstract = "We specify Isap v2.0, a lightweight permutation-based authenticated encryption algorithm that is designed to ease protection against side-channel and fault attacks. This design is an improved version of the previously published Isap v1.0, and offers increased protection against implementation attacks as well as more efficient implementations. Isap v2.0 is a candidate in NIST{\textquoteright}s LightWeight Cryptography (LWC) project, which aims to identify and standardize authenticated ciphers that are well-suited for applications in constrained environments. We provide a self-contained specification of the new Isap v2.0 mode and discuss its design rationale. We formally prove the security of the Isap v2.0 mode in the leakage-resilient setting. Finally, in an extensive implementation overview, we show that Isap v2.0 can be implemented securely with very low area requirements.",

keywords = "Authenticated encryption, Leakage resilience, NIST LWC, Sponges",

author = "Christoph Dobraunig and Maria Eichlseder and Stefan Mangard and Florian Mendel and Bart Mennink and Robert Primas and Thomas Unterluggauer",

year = "2020",

month = jun,

doi = "https://doi.org/10.13154/tosc.v2020.iS1.390-416",

language = "English",

volume = "2020",

pages = "390--416",

journal = "IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology",

issn = "2519-173X",

publisher = "Ruhr-Universit{\"a}t Bochum",

number = "Special Issue 1",

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TY - JOUR

T1 - ISAP v2.0

AU - Dobraunig, Christoph

AU - Eichlseder, Maria

AU - Mangard, Stefan

AU - Mendel, Florian

AU - Mennink, Bart

AU - Primas, Robert

AU - Unterluggauer, Thomas

PY - 2020/6

Y1 - 2020/6

N2 - We specify Isap v2.0, a lightweight permutation-based authenticated encryption algorithm that is designed to ease protection against side-channel and fault attacks. This design is an improved version of the previously published Isap v1.0, and offers increased protection against implementation attacks as well as more efficient implementations. Isap v2.0 is a candidate in NIST’s LightWeight Cryptography (LWC) project, which aims to identify and standardize authenticated ciphers that are well-suited for applications in constrained environments. We provide a self-contained specification of the new Isap v2.0 mode and discuss its design rationale. We formally prove the security of the Isap v2.0 mode in the leakage-resilient setting. Finally, in an extensive implementation overview, we show that Isap v2.0 can be implemented securely with very low area requirements.

AB - We specify Isap v2.0, a lightweight permutation-based authenticated encryption algorithm that is designed to ease protection against side-channel and fault attacks. This design is an improved version of the previously published Isap v1.0, and offers increased protection against implementation attacks as well as more efficient implementations. Isap v2.0 is a candidate in NIST’s LightWeight Cryptography (LWC) project, which aims to identify and standardize authenticated ciphers that are well-suited for applications in constrained environments. We provide a self-contained specification of the new Isap v2.0 mode and discuss its design rationale. We formally prove the security of the Isap v2.0 mode in the leakage-resilient setting. Finally, in an extensive implementation overview, we show that Isap v2.0 can be implemented securely with very low area requirements.

KW - Authenticated encryption

KW - Leakage resilience

KW - NIST LWC

KW - Sponges

UR - https://isap.iaik.tugraz.at/

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DO - https://doi.org/10.13154/tosc.v2020.iS1.390-416

M3 - Article

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VL - 2020

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EP - 416

JO - IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology

JF - IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology

IS - Special Issue 1

ER -

ISAP v2.0

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Espresso - Scalable hardware-secured authentication and personalization of intelligent sensor nodes

Dessnet - Dependable, secure and time-aware sensor networks

EU - SOPHIA - Securing Software against Physical Attacks

Cite this

ISAP v2.0

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Projects

Espresso - Scalable hardware-secured authentication and personalization of intelligent sensor nodes

Dessnet - Dependable, secure and time-aware sensor networks

EU - SOPHIA - Securing Software against Physical Attacks

Cite this