Layered Binary Templating

Martin Schwarzl*, Erik Kraft, Daniel Gruss

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference paperpeer-review


We present a new generic cache template attack technique, LBTA, layered binary templating attacks.
LBTA uses multiple coarsergrained side channels to speed up cache-line granularity templating, ranging from 64 B to 2 MB in practice and in theory beyond.
We discover first-come-first-serve data placement and data deduplication during compilation and linking as novel security issues that introduce sidechannel-friendly binary layouts.
We exploit this in inter-keystroke timing attacks and, depending on the target, even full keylogging attacks , e.g., on Chrome, Signal, Threema, Discord, and the passky password manager, indicating that all Chromium-based apps are affected.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationApplied Cryptography and Network Security
Subtitle of host publication21st International Conference, ACNS 2023, Kyoto, Japan, June 19–22, 2023, Proceedings, Part I
Place of PublicationCham
Number of pages27
Publication statusPublished - 2023
Event21st International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security: ACNS 2023 - Kyoto, Japan
Duration: 19 Jun 202322 Jun 2023

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science


Conference21st International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
Abbreviated titleACNS 2023


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