OPRFs from Isogenies: Designs and Analysis

Lena Heimberger, Tobias Hennerbichler, Fredrik Meisingseth, Sebastian Ramacher, Christian Rechberger

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference paperpeer-review

Abstract

Oblivious Pseudorandom Functions (OPRFs) are an elementary building block in cryptographic and privacy-preserving applications. While there are numerous pre-quantum secure OPRF constructions, it is unclear which of the proposed options for post-quantum secure constructions are practical for modern-day applications. In this work, we focus on isogeny group actions, as the associated low bandwidth leads to efficient constructions. We introduce OPUS, a novel Naor-Reingold-based OPRF from isogenies without oblivious transfer, and show efficient evaluations of the Naor-Reingold PRF using CSIDH and CSI-FiSh. Additionally, we analyze a previous proposal of a CSIDH-based OPRF and that the straightforward instantiation of the protocol leaks the server’s private key. As a result, we propose mitigations to address those shortcomings, which require additional hardness assumptions. Our results report a very competitive protocol when combined with lattices for Oblivious Transfer. Our evaluation shows that OPUS and the repaired, generic construction are competitive with other proposals in terms of runtime efficiency and communication size. More concretely, OPUS achieves almost two orders of magnitude less communication overhead compared to the next-best lattice-based OPRF at the cost of higher latency and higher computational cost, and the repaired construction. Finally, we demonstrate the efficiency of OPUS and the generic NR-OT in two use cases: first, we instantiate OPAQUE, a protocol for asymmetric authenticated key exchange. Compared to classical elliptic curve cryptography, which is considered insecure in the presence of efficient quantum computers, this results in less than 100 × longer computation on average and around 1000× more communication overhead. Second, we perform an unbalanced private set intersection and show that the communication overhead can be roughly the same when using isogenies or elliptic curves, at the cost of much higher runtime. Conversely, for sets of the size 210, we report a runtime around 200× slower than the elliptic curve PSI. This concretizes the overhead of performing PSI and using OPAQUE with isogenies for the first time.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationACM AsiaCCS 2024 - Proceedings of the 19th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security
PublisherAssociation of Computing Machinery
Pages575-588
Number of pages14
ISBN (Electronic)9798400704826
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jul 2024
Event19th ACM ASIA Conference on Computer and Communications Security: ASIACCS 2024 - Singapur, Singapore
Duration: 1 Jul 20245 Jul 2024
Conference number: 19
https://asiaccs2024.sutd.edu.sg/

Conference

Conference19th ACM ASIA Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Abbreviated titleASIACCS 2024
Country/TerritorySingapore
CitySingapur
Period1/07/245/07/24
Internet address

Keywords

  • CSIDH
  • Isogenies
  • Oblivious Pseudorandom Function
  • OPAQUE
  • OPUS
  • Private Set Intersection

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computational Theory and Mathematics
  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Computer Science Applications

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