Randomizing the Montgomery Multiplication to Repel Template Attacks on Multiplicative Masking

Marcel Medwed; Christoph Herbst

Randomizing the Montgomery Multiplication to Repel Template Attacks on Multiplicative Masking

Marcel Medwed, Christoph Herbst

Institute of Applied Information Processing and Communications (7050)

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference paper › peer-review

Abstract

For a long time multiplicative masking together with highly regular exponentiation algorithms was believed to thwart all side-channel based threats. Recent research results showed that the multiplicative masking itself can be attacked in order to recover the used masks. In this
paper we propose a countermeasure which closes this security gap. The basic idea is to protect the masking step by introducing a randomized multiplication. The proposed method is cheap in terms of performance overhead. The memory overhead is reasonable.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Workshop Proceedings COSADE 201
Subtitle of host publication	1st International Workshop on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design
Pages	56-71
Publication status	Published - 2010
Event	1st International Workshop on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design: COSADE 2010 - Darmstadt, Germany Duration: 4 Feb 2010 → 5 Feb 2010

Conference

Conference	1st International Workshop on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design
Abbreviated title	COSADE 2010
Country/Territory	Germany
City	Darmstadt
Period	4/02/10 → 5/02/10

Treatment code (Nähere Zuordnung)

Application

Access to Document

draft.pdfAccepted author manuscript, 381 KB

POWER TRUST - Low POWer & Energy Relevant techniques Targetting Robust Universal Security in deep sub-micron Technologies
Kirschbaum, M., Medwed, M., Szekely, A., Tillich, S., Dominikus, S., Herbst, C. & Aigner, M. J.
1/03/08 → 31/12/10
Project: Research project
ARTEUS - Attack Resistance and Tolerance Enabling Universal Security
Schläffer, M., Medwed, M., Popp, T., Schmidt, J., Rijmen, V. & Aigner, M. J.
1/02/08 → 31/08/10
Project: Research project
FWF - Unters. Seitenkanal Att - Investigation of Side-Channel Attacks (ISCA)
Dominikus, S., Hutter, M., Popp, T., Mangard, S., Oswald, M. E., Rijmen, V., Plos, T., Posch, R. & Herbst, C.
1/04/06 → 1/04/09
Project: Research project

Cite this

@inproceedings{f67a41469a264252945e8344359a45c8,

title = "Randomizing the Montgomery Multiplication to Repel Template Attacks on Multiplicative Masking",

abstract = "For a long time multiplicative masking together with highly regular exponentiation algorithms was believed to thwart all side-channel based threats. Recent research results showed that the multiplicative masking itself can be attacked in order to recover the used masks. In thispaper we propose a countermeasure which closes this security gap. The basic idea is to protect the masking step by introducing a randomized multiplication. The proposed method is cheap in terms of performance overhead. The memory overhead is reasonable.",

author = "Marcel Medwed and Christoph Herbst",

year = "2010",

language = "English",

pages = "56--71",

booktitle = "Workshop Proceedings COSADE 201",

note = "1st International Workshop on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design : COSADE 2010, COSADE 2010 ; Conference date: 04-02-2010 Through 05-02-2010",

}

TY - GEN

T1 - Randomizing the Montgomery Multiplication to Repel Template Attacks on Multiplicative Masking

AU - Medwed, Marcel

AU - Herbst, Christoph

PY - 2010

Y1 - 2010

N2 - For a long time multiplicative masking together with highly regular exponentiation algorithms was believed to thwart all side-channel based threats. Recent research results showed that the multiplicative masking itself can be attacked in order to recover the used masks. In thispaper we propose a countermeasure which closes this security gap. The basic idea is to protect the masking step by introducing a randomized multiplication. The proposed method is cheap in terms of performance overhead. The memory overhead is reasonable.

AB - For a long time multiplicative masking together with highly regular exponentiation algorithms was believed to thwart all side-channel based threats. Recent research results showed that the multiplicative masking itself can be attacked in order to recover the used masks. In thispaper we propose a countermeasure which closes this security gap. The basic idea is to protect the masking step by introducing a randomized multiplication. The proposed method is cheap in terms of performance overhead. The memory overhead is reasonable.

M3 - Conference paper

SP - 56

EP - 71

BT - Workshop Proceedings COSADE 201

T2 - 1st International Workshop on Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design

Y2 - 4 February 2010 through 5 February 2010

ER -

Randomizing the Montgomery Multiplication to Repel Template Attacks on Multiplicative Masking

Abstract

Conference

Treatment code (Nähere Zuordnung)

Access to Document

Fingerprint

Projects

POWER TRUST - Low POWer & Energy Relevant techniques Targetting Robust Universal Security in deep sub-micron Technologies

ARTEUS - Attack Resistance and Tolerance Enabling Universal Security

FWF - Unters. Seitenkanal Att - Investigation of Side-Channel Attacks (ISCA)

Cite this