Scatter and Split Securely: Defeating Cache Contention and Occupancy Attacks

Lukas Giner; Stefan Steinegger; Antoon Purnal; Maria Eichlseder; Thomas Unterluggauer; Stefan Mangard; Daniel Gruss

doi:10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179440

Scatter and Split Securely: Defeating Cache Contention and Occupancy Attacks

Lukas Giner, Stefan Steinegger, Antoon Purnal, Maria Eichlseder, Thomas Unterluggauer, Stefan Mangard, Daniel Gruss

Institute of Information Security (7050)

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference paper › peer-review

Abstract

In this paper, we propose SassCache, a secure skewed associative cache with keyed index mapping. For this purpose, we design a new two-layered, low-latency cryptographic construction with configurable output coverage based on state-of-the-art cryptographic primitives. Based on this construction, SassCache is the first secure randomized cache with secure spacing. Victim cache lines automatically hide in locations the attacker cannot reach after less than 1 access on average. Consequently, attackers cannot evict the cache line, no matter which and how many memory accesses they perform. Our security analysis shows that all existing techniques for eviction set construction fail, and state-of-the-art attacks only apply to 1 in 3 million addresses, where SassCache is still as secure as ScatterCache. Compared to standard caches, SassCache has a single-threaded performance penalty of 1.75 % on the last-level cache hit rate in the SPEC2017 benchmark, and an average decrease of 11.7 p.p. in hit rate for MiBench, GAP and Scimark for our high-security settings.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
Pages	2273-2287
Number of pages	15
ISBN (Electronic)	978-1-6654-9336-9
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179440
Publication status	Published - Jul 2023
Event	44th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy: S&P 2023 - San Francisco, United States Duration: 22 May 2023 → 25 May 2023 https://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2023/

Course

Course	44th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Abbreviated title	S&P 2023
Country/Territory	United States
City	San Francisco
Period	22/05/23 → 25/05/23
Internet address	https://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2023/

Keywords

secure cache
cache architecture
side channel
Cryptography
Applied-Cryptography
Secure-Caches
Hardware-Security
Side-Channels

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Software
Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality
Computer Networks and Communications

Access to Document

10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179440

sassAccepted author manuscript, 479 KB

https://ginerlukas.com/publications/papers/sass.pdf

Cite this

Giner, L, Steinegger, S, Purnal, A, Eichlseder, M, Unterluggauer, T, Mangard, S & Gruss, D 2023, Scatter and Split Securely: Defeating Cache Contention and Occupancy Attacks. in 2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). pp. 2273-2287, 44th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, San Francisco, California, United States, 22/05/23. https://doi.org/10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179440

@inproceedings{5f794dfd5cc042e19ed3f3c00a37cdcc,

title = "Scatter and Split Securely: Defeating Cache Contention and Occupancy Attacks",

abstract = "In this paper, we propose SassCache, a secure skewed associative cache with keyed index mapping. For this purpose, we design a new two-layered, low-latency cryptographic construction with configurable output coverage based on state-of-the-art cryptographic primitives. Based on this construction, SassCache is the first secure randomized cache with secure spacing. Victim cache lines automatically hide in locations the attacker cannot reach after less than 1 access on average. Consequently, attackers cannot evict the cache line, no matter which and how many memory accesses they perform. Our security analysis shows that all existing techniques for eviction set construction fail, and state-of-the-art attacks only apply to 1 in 3 million addresses, where SassCache is still as secure as ScatterCache. Compared to standard caches, SassCache has a single-threaded performance penalty of 1.75 % on the last-level cache hit rate in the SPEC2017 benchmark, and an average decrease of 11.7 p.p. in hit rate for MiBench, GAP and Scimark for our high-security settings.",

keywords = "secure cache, cache architecture, side channel, Cryptography, Applied-Cryptography, Secure-Caches, Hardware-Security, Side-Channels",

author = "Lukas Giner and Stefan Steinegger and Antoon Purnal and Maria Eichlseder and Thomas Unterluggauer and Stefan Mangard and Daniel Gruss",

year = "2023",

month = jul,

doi = "10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179440",

language = "English",

pages = "2273--2287",

booktitle = "2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)",

note = "44th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy : S&P 2023, S&P 2023 ; Conference date: 22-05-2023 Through 25-05-2023",

url = "https://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2023/",

}

TY - GEN

T1 - Scatter and Split Securely: Defeating Cache Contention and Occupancy Attacks

AU - Giner, Lukas

AU - Steinegger, Stefan

AU - Purnal, Antoon

AU - Eichlseder, Maria

AU - Unterluggauer, Thomas

AU - Mangard, Stefan

AU - Gruss, Daniel

PY - 2023/7

Y1 - 2023/7

N2 - In this paper, we propose SassCache, a secure skewed associative cache with keyed index mapping. For this purpose, we design a new two-layered, low-latency cryptographic construction with configurable output coverage based on state-of-the-art cryptographic primitives. Based on this construction, SassCache is the first secure randomized cache with secure spacing. Victim cache lines automatically hide in locations the attacker cannot reach after less than 1 access on average. Consequently, attackers cannot evict the cache line, no matter which and how many memory accesses they perform. Our security analysis shows that all existing techniques for eviction set construction fail, and state-of-the-art attacks only apply to 1 in 3 million addresses, where SassCache is still as secure as ScatterCache. Compared to standard caches, SassCache has a single-threaded performance penalty of 1.75 % on the last-level cache hit rate in the SPEC2017 benchmark, and an average decrease of 11.7 p.p. in hit rate for MiBench, GAP and Scimark for our high-security settings.

AB - In this paper, we propose SassCache, a secure skewed associative cache with keyed index mapping. For this purpose, we design a new two-layered, low-latency cryptographic construction with configurable output coverage based on state-of-the-art cryptographic primitives. Based on this construction, SassCache is the first secure randomized cache with secure spacing. Victim cache lines automatically hide in locations the attacker cannot reach after less than 1 access on average. Consequently, attackers cannot evict the cache line, no matter which and how many memory accesses they perform. Our security analysis shows that all existing techniques for eviction set construction fail, and state-of-the-art attacks only apply to 1 in 3 million addresses, where SassCache is still as secure as ScatterCache. Compared to standard caches, SassCache has a single-threaded performance penalty of 1.75 % on the last-level cache hit rate in the SPEC2017 benchmark, and an average decrease of 11.7 p.p. in hit rate for MiBench, GAP and Scimark for our high-security settings.

KW - secure cache

KW - cache architecture

KW - side channel

KW - Cryptography

KW - Applied-Cryptography

KW - Secure-Caches

KW - Hardware-Security

KW - Side-Channels

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85166473517&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179440

DO - 10.1109/SP46215.2023.10179440

M3 - Conference paper

SP - 2273

EP - 2287

BT - 2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)

T2 - 44th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy

Y2 - 22 May 2023 through 25 May 2023

ER -

Scatter and Split Securely: Defeating Cache Contention and Occupancy Attacks

Abstract

Course

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint