

Hardware Acceleration Efforts for Homomorphic Encryption

Medha: Microcoded Hardware Accelerator for computing on Encrypted Data

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- 1. Homomorphic Encryption
 - Challenges in accelerating HE
- 2. Medha: Microcoded Hardware Accelerator for computing on Encrypted Data
 - Architecture of Homomorphic Processor
 - Customized on-chip memory design
 - Placement-friendly Layout
 - Design Methodology for Flexible Polynomial Degree
 - Evaluation Results
- 3. Conclusion

• Enables computation on encrypted data.



- Holy grail of cryptography: Fully homomorphic encryption.
- RSA cryptosystem (1978) is homomorphic...
 - with respect to multiplication.

$$m_a = a^e \pmod{n}, m_b = b^e \pmod{n}$$

 $m_a.m_b = a^e.b^e = (a.b)^e \pmod{n}$
 $m_a.m_b)^d \pmod{n} = ((a.b)^e)^d \pmod{n} = a.b$

- Paillier (1999) cryptosystem is homomorphic with respect to addition.
- A fully homomorphic scheme for both addition and multiplication?

• Craig Gentry proposed the first fully homomorphic scheme in 2009.



• Achieved it using a special operation called boostrapping.



First image source: https://www.technologyreview.com/technology/homomorphic-encryption/ Second image source: M. Joye, SoK: Fully omomorphic Encryption over the [Discretized] Torus, CHES, 2022.

- Homomorphic encryption use cases
 - Privacy-preserving machine learning
 - Secure computation in cloud
 - Financial services, healthcare, government etc.

- Homomorphic encryption research
 - New schemes with better performance/less complexity/different applications
 - 1st generation schemes: First schemes, very inefficient
 - 2nd generation schemes: Enables faster integer/fixed-pt arithmetic (e.g., BGV, CKKS)
 - 3rd generation schemes: Enables efficient Boolean algebra (e.g., FHEW)
 - Development of homomorphic application/compilers
 - Acceleration of HE

- A brief summary of acceleration efforts. Two main tracks:
 - Real accelerator prototypes vs. simulation-based modelling of accelerators.



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[F1] Axel Feldmann et al. F1: A fast and programmable accelerator for fully homomorphic encryption. MICRO 2021.
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Why do we need HW acceleration?

1. Computationally intensive:

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1. Computationally intensive: $100,000 \times$ plain computation



- 1. Computationally intensive
- 2. Lots of polynomial arithmetic operations
 - Large degree polynomial arithmetic
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 - On-Chip memory is limited
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- 2. Lots of polynomial arithmetic operations
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- \leftarrow This problem is solved using RNS

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Application of Residue Number System (RNS)

- 1. Take a modulus $Q = \prod_{i=1}^{L-1} q_i$ where q_i are coprime.
- 2. Process residues independently (to some extent)



Small coefficients and Parallel computation

Parallel computation flow example





Multiplication:

 $\begin{aligned} c &= [c_{0_i}, c_{1_i}], \, c' = [c_{0_i}', c_{1_i}'] \\ d_{mult} &= [d_{0_i}, d_{1_i}, d_{2_i}] \\ d_{0_i} &= c_{0_i} \times c_{0_i}' \\ d_{1_i} &= c_{0_i} \times c_{1_i}' + c_{1_i} \times c_{0_i}' \\ d_{2_i} &= c_{1_i} \times c_{1_i}' \\ \forall i \in [0, L-1] \end{aligned}$

Scheme operations

Relinearization:

 $d_{mult} = [d_{0_i}, d_{1_i}, d_{2_i}] \
ightarrow c_{mult}'' = [c_{0_i}'', c_{1_i}'']$

$$\begin{array}{l} c_{0j}'' = \sum_{i=0}^{L-1} d_{2_i}.KSK_{0_{ij}} \; \forall j \in [0, L] \\ c_{1j}'' = \sum_{i=0}^{L-1} d_{2_i}.KSK_{1_{ij}} \; \forall j \in [0, L] \end{array}$$



HW design challenge!



Threads need to exchange data.

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 - RNS-HEAAN
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Design goals:

- Implementation and verification on real FPGA (Xilinx Alveo U250 card)
- Eliminating off-chip memory communication
- Supporting at least $n = 2^{14}$ with RNS moduli sizes 54/60-bit for RNS-CKKS

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Thread \rightarrow One residue polynomial arthmetic unit (RPAU)



The overall architecture of one RPAU.



- It has two main cores
 - 16-butterfly NTT unit
 - 4-core Dyadic unit
- Memory blocks

Why do we use two separate cores?



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• Parallel execution of NTT & dyadic cores for key-switching procedure results in:

40% reduction in cycle!



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Our goal: Implementing homomorphic operations using only on-chip memory. We analyzed the peak memory requirement of one RPAU.

Example: For $n = 2^{14}$ with 10 RNS bases of 54/60-bits, each RPAU needs to store at least 49 polynomials of size 2^{14} for residue polynomials and keys.

• On-chip BRAMs or URAMs alone cannot fulfill the requirements...

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Optimizations to reduce on-chip memory requirements

- 1. On the fly evaluation key generation
- 2. Utilizing left-over bits in BRAM/URAM

1. On-the-fly evaluation key generation

 $KSK_0 \leftarrow \$$ $KSK_0 \leftarrow \mathsf{PRNG}(\mathsf{seeds})$ $KSK_1 \leftarrow \mathbf{f}(KSK_0, s)$ 1. On-the-fly evaluation key generation

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Customized on-chip memory design

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Customized on-chip memory design

- 2. Utilizing left-over bits in BRAM/URAM
 - One URAM address can store 72-bits
 - One BRAM address can store 18/36/72-bits

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We created a virtual memory to utilize left-over bits in BRAM/URAM.

• Example: 54-bit coefficient storage in URAM





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Placement-friendly Layout

Each RNS base is implemented by one RPAU.

• Key-switching operation requires polynomials to be exchanged between RPAUs.



Placing/Interconnecting RPAUs is a huge engineering challenge!

Placement-friendly Layout



- Alveo U250 platform consists of four 'semi-separated' SLR regions
- Two neighboring SLRs are connected using a limited number of wires.

Placing/Interconnecting the RPAUs must consider SLR-to-SLR connection constraints.



- Complicates placement and routing
- Many SLR-crossing nets
- Achieves very low clock frequency

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- Only neighboring RPAUs are connected
- Data is sent through a chain of RPAUs
- Achieves high clock frequency



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Evaluation

As a proof of concept, our implementation employs 10 RPAUs and supports two parameter sets.

• $(\log_2(pQ) = 438, n = 2^{14})$ and $(\log_2(pQ) = 546, n = 2^{15})$

Resource utilization on Alveo U250 card.

- 1.09M LUTs (55.4%), 3,607 DSPs (29.3%)
- 1,576.5 BRAMs (58.6%), 931 URAMs (72.8%)



Evaluation Results

End-to-end application benchmark for the logistic regression model proposed by iDASH2017 competition winners.

• $64 \times$ speedup compared to the implementation in SEAL

Comparison with SEAL and HEAX:



Comparison with HW-based HE accelerators in the literature



Conclusion

- Accelerators show promising performance results, but ...
 - most of them are not proven in silicon
 - only few $\mathsf{FPGA}/\mathsf{GPU}$ works are verified and tested in real HW
- We proposed one of *few* real hardware accelerators in literature
- HW acceleration is not enough to make HE practical, we need better schemes
- HW Benchmarking and comparison is challenging.
 - Very few open source works.



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