Remote Scheduler Contention Attacks

Stefan Gast*, Jonas Juffinger, Lukas Maar, Christoph Royer, Andreas Kogler, Daniel Gruss

*Korrespondierende/r Autor/-in für diese Arbeit

Publikation: Beitrag in Buch/Bericht/KonferenzbandBeitrag in einem KonferenzbandBegutachtung

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate unexplored aspects of scheduler contention: We systematically study the leakage of all scheduler queues on AMD Zen 3 and show that all queues leak. We mount the first scheduler contention attacks on Zen 4, with a novel measurement method evoking an out-of-order race condition, more precise than the state of the art. We demonstrate the first inter-keystroke timing attacks based on scheduler contention, with an F1 score of ≥99.5 % and a standard deviation below 4 ms from the ground truth. Our end-to-end JavaScript attack transmits across Firefox instances, bypassing cross-origin policies and site isolation, with 891.9 bit/s (Zen 3) and 940.7 bit/s (Zen 4).
Originalspracheenglisch
TitelFinancial Cryptography and Data Security - 28th International Conference, FC 2024, Revised Selected Papers
PublikationsstatusVeröffentlicht - 4 März 2024
VeranstaltungFinancial Cryptography and Data Security 2024 - Willemstad, Curaçao
Dauer: 4 März 20248 März 2024
https://fc24.ifca.ai/index.html

Publikationsreihe

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Herausgeber (Verlag)Springer-Verlag

Konferenz

KonferenzFinancial Cryptography and Data Security 2024
KurztitelFC 2024
Land/GebietCuraçao
OrtWillemstad
Zeitraum4/03/248/03/24
Internetadresse

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Information systems

Fields of Expertise

  • Information, Communication & Computing

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