Leakage and Tamper Resilient Permutation-Based Cryptography

Robert Primas, Christoph Erwin Dobraunig, Bart Mennink

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference paperpeer-review


Implementation attacks such as power analysis and fault attacks have shown that, if potential attackers have physical access to a cryptographic device, achieving practical security requires more considerations apart from just cryptanalytic security. In recent years, and with the advent of micro-architectural or hardware-oriented attacks, it became more and more clear that similar attack vectors can also be exploited on larger computing platforms and without the requirement of physical proximity of an attacker. While newly discovered attacks typically come with implementation recommendations that help counteract a specific attack vector, the process of constantly patching cryptographic code is quite time consuming in some cases, and simply not possible in other cases.

What adds up to the problem is that the popular approach of leakage resilient cryptography only provably solves part of the problem: it discards the threat of faults. Therefore, we put forward the usage of leakage and tamper resilient cryptographic algorithms, as they can offer built-in protection against various types of physical and hardware oriented attacks, likely including attack vectors that will only be discovered in the future. In detail, we present the - to the best of our knowledge - first framework for proving the security of permutation-based symmetric cryptographic constructions in the leakage and tamper resilient setting. As a proof of concept, we apply the framework to a sponge-based stream encryption scheme called asakey and provide a practical analysis of its resistance against side channel and fault attacks
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationCCS 2022 - Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Place of PublicationNew York, NY
PublisherAssociation of Computing Machinery
Number of pages15
ISBN (Electronic)978-1-4503-9450-5
Publication statusPublished - 7 Nov 2022
Event2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security: ACM CSS 2022 - Los Angeles, United States
Duration: 7 Nov 202211 Nov 2022

Publication series

NameProceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
ISSN (Print)1543-7221


Conference2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Abbreviated titleACM CSS 2022
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityLos Angeles


  • leakage resilience
  • accumulated leakage
  • sponge-based encryption
  • side channel measurements
  • fault attacks

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Computer Networks and Communications


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