Shortest Paths from a Group Perspective-A Note on Selfish Routing Games with Cognitive Agents

Johannes Scholz*, Richard L. Church

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


This paper presents an analysis of the effects of cognitive agents employing selfish routing behavior in traffic networks with linear latency functions. Selfish routing occurs when each agent traveling on a network acts in a purely selfish manner, therefore the Braess Paradox is likely to occur. The Braess Paradox describes a situation where an additional edge with positive capacity is added to a given network, which leads to higher total system delay. By applying the concept of cognitive agents, each agent is able to make a range of non-selfish and selfish decisions. In addition, each agent has to cope with uncertainty in terms of travel time information associated with the traffic system, a factor in real-world traffic networks. This paper evaluates the influence of travel time uncertainty, and possible non-selfish decisions of the agents on overall network delay. The results indicate that both non-selfish behavior and uncertainty have an influence on overall travel delay. In addition, understanding the influence of cognitive agents on delay can help to better plan and influence traffic flows resulting in “closer to optimal” flows involving overall lower delays.
Original languageEnglish
Article number345
JournalISPRS International Journal of Geo-Information
Issue number9
Publication statusPublished - 2018

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Geography, Planning and Development
  • Computers in Earth Sciences
  • Earth and Planetary Sciences (miscellaneous)

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