The impact of withholding flexibility: an application to ramp bidding in electricity markets

Ekaterina Moiseeva, M.R. Hesamzadeh, Sonja Wogrin

Publikation: KonferenzbeitragAbstractBegutachtung

Abstract

We compare a one-level and a bilevel equilibrium game in which firms' flexibility is either: decided at the same time as their production decisions; or sequentially. We analize the impact that different market structures have on the equilibrium outcomes. Our findings are applied to the ramp bidding game in electricity markets. It is observed that electricity producers may strategically declare a lower ramp rate if they expect such decision to maximize their profit in the production stage.
Originalspracheenglisch
PublikationsstatusVeröffentlicht - 2015
Extern publiziertJa
Veranstaltung2015 INFORMS Annual Meeting - Philadelphia, USA / Vereinigte Staaten
Dauer: 1 Nov. 20154 Nov. 2015

Konferenz

Konferenz2015 INFORMS Annual Meeting
Land/GebietUSA / Vereinigte Staaten
OrtPhiladelphia
Zeitraum1/11/154/11/15

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