The impact of withholding flexibility: an application to ramp bidding in electricity markets

Ekaterina Moiseeva, M.R. Hesamzadeh, Sonja Wogrin

Research output: Contribution to conferenceAbstractpeer-review


We compare a one-level and a bilevel equilibrium game in which firms' flexibility is either: decided at the same time as their production decisions; or sequentially. We analize the impact that different market structures have on the equilibrium outcomes. Our findings are applied to the ramp bidding game in electricity markets. It is observed that electricity producers may strategically declare a lower ramp rate if they expect such decision to maximize their profit in the production stage.
Original languageEnglish
Publication statusPublished - 2015
Externally publishedYes
Event2015 INFORMS Annual Meeting - Philadelphia, United States
Duration: 1 Nov 20154 Nov 2015


Conference2015 INFORMS Annual Meeting
Country/TerritoryUnited States

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